This study compares the hedging practices of Swedish and Korean nonfinancial firms. Our findings suggest that the aim of hedging differed between firms in the two countries. Korean firms mostly focused on reducing fluctuations in cash flows, while Swedish firms more commonly emphasized reducing fluctuations of accounting numbers. The proportion of firms that used derivatives was significantly lower in the Korean than in the Swedish sample, a finding that may stem from the relative immaturity of the Korean derivatives markets. The evidence suggests that Korean firms hedged as much as Swedish firms but substituted foreign debt for derivatives. Furthermore, Korean firms appeared to be less rigorous than Swedish firms in overseeing risk management activity. Finally, a large proportion of firms in both countries used a profit-based approach to evaluating the risk management function. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
This paper uses survey evidence to compare Swedish and Korean firms' foreign exchange risk management practices. This is of interest because, as Lel's (2003) La Porta et al. (1998) reported that Korea lags Sweden in terms of law enforcement, antidirector rights, cash-flow rights, and accounting standards. These differences may cause Korean and Swedish firms to adopt different hedging policies and practices; by studying these, we may improve our understanding of firms' risk management practices.
Several methods are available for managing foreign exchange exposure, including the use of financial derivatives such as forward contracts and currency options, foreigndenominated debt, and internal methods such as leading and lagging. Prior survey evidence pertaining to hedging primarily focused on the use of derivatives by firms in local markets, 1 while a few studies, notably those of Berkman et al. (1997) , Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) , Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) , Sheedy (2001) , and Bodnar et al. (2003) , also compared derivatives use between countries. Recent studies have presented survey evidence pertaining to other hedging techniques, such as the use of foreign-denominated debt and internal hedging techniques. Such studies include those of Hakkarainen et al. (1998) , who surveyed Finnish firms; Joseph (2000) , who analyzed British firms; Marshall (2000) , who analyzed regional differences between Asia-Pacific and Western multinational corporations (MNCs); and Allayannis et al. (2003) , who investigated the hedging practices of East Asian firms during the recent East Asian financial crisis.
This paper adds to existing research by analyzing country differences in foreign exchange risk-management practices between Swedish and Korean firms. The focus is on descriptive data comparing hedging practices; these data are complemented by direct tests in order to investigate the potential of firm characteristics to explain differences. Korea and Sweden are both export-oriented countries, heavily dependent on foreign trade, suggesting that their markets would be suitable for this type of study. The countries' markets differ in other ways, such as their stage of economic and financial development. While Swedish derivatives markets are well developed, comparable Korean markets have been heavily regulated until very recently; this may have reduced firms access to, and consequently, knowledge of derivative instruments.
Use of derivatives and other hedging techniques are investigated, using survey evidence pertaining to the foreign exchange exposure and hedging practices of 163 firms in the two countries that replied to a survey distributed in September 2000. In contrast to Marshall (2000) , who investigated only large multinational corporations, we sent our survey to all nonfinancial firms listed on the major stock exchange in each country. In view of the findings of Lel (2003) and Bartram et al. (2003) , this is an important difference. Lel (2003) investigated large, international firms listed via ADRs in the US and found that countryspecific factors were relatively more important than firm-specific factors in explaining the probability of hedging. Bartram et al. (2003) used a larger sample including smaller firms and found that firm-specific factors were relatively more important than country-specific factors. The survey procedure used in our research produced a representative sample of both large and small firms in Korea and Sweden, which may enhance our general understanding of firms' hedging practices.
Our findings suggest that while there are similarities between the hedging practices of firms in the two countries, there are notable differences as well. Firms in both countries were equally likely to decide to hedge foreign exchange exposure, this decision being dependent of level of exposure and firm size. However, the aim of hedging activities differed. Korean firms were more likely to focus on minimizing fluctuations of cash flow rather than accounting earnings, while Swedish firms were more likely to focus on accounting numbers. This is in line with the findings of Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) and Alkebäck et al. (in press) concerning Swedish firms. Perhaps our most striking finding is that the proportion of firms that used derivatives was significantly lower in the Korean than in the Swedish sample. This could not be accounted for by firm characteristics such as foreign exchange exposure, size, liquidity, or leverage. A possible explanation for this difference is that derivatives markets in Korea have been heavily regulated until very recently, which would support the finding of Lel (2003) that the degree of financial market development influences hedging policies. In line with this, Korean firms were more likely to use foreign-denominated debt and used it more extensively than did Swedish firms, suggesting a substitution effect. Furthermore, Korean firms were less rigorous in monitoring their risk exposure positions than were Swedish firms. This is in accordance with the findings of Sheedy (2001) and suggests that Asian firms lag Western firms in this regard. An absolute majority of firms in both countries used a profit-based approach to evaluate the risk management function. This contradicts theoretical assumptions and adds to the findings of Bodnar et al. (1998) and Sheedy (2001) .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents prior research, Section 3 presents the sample description and variable definitions, Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the report. Throughout the paper, the findings are compared with evidence from other studies wherever possible.
Prior survey evidence
Prior survey evidence pertaining to regional and country differences in hedging practices has revealed significant differences in terms of hedging practices between US and New Zealand firms (Berkman et al., 1997) , between US and Swedish firms (Alkebäck and Hagelin, 1999) , between US and German firms (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999) , between large MNCs in the Asia-Pacific region and in the US and the UK (Marshall, 2000) , between US firms and firms in Hong Kong and Singapore (Sheedy, 2001) , and between Dutch and US firms (Bodnar et al., 2003) . Berkman et al. (1997) and Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) found similar differences in the hedging practices of New Zealand and Swedish firms as compared to firms in the US. The evidence presented in these studies shows a positive relationship between firm size and derivatives use in all markets, suggesting that there are economies of scale in the use of derivatives. Furthermore, the use of foreign exchange (FX) derivatives was more common than the use of interest rate derivatives, commodity derivatives, and equity derivatives in all three countries, which underlines the relative importance of FX exposure to firms in most countries. The use of FX derivatives was more common in New Zealand and Sweden than in the US, possibly because of the relative size and international dependency of these markets. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) provided evidence suggesting that German firms were more likely than US firms to use derivatives. They were also more comfortable with derivatives use, indicating significantly less concern about issues related to derivatives than is the case in US firms. It was suggested that this might stem from the German firms' consistently stricter policies governing the control and monitoring of derivatives use within the firm. Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) produced similar results when comparing their Swedish sample to the US sample of Bodnar et al. (1996) . Marshall (2000) investigated the FX hedging practices of MNCs in the Asia Pacific region, the US, and the UK and found similarities as well as differences among MNCs from the different regions. The MNCs were similar in their use of internal hedging techniques, but there were differences between the Asia Pacific MNCs and those from the other regions in terms of the emphasis on FX risk management. FX risk management was found to be significantly more important for the Asia Pacific MNCs than for MNCs from the US and the UK, and the author suggested that this might be explained by the Asian financial crisis. Sheedy (2001) surveyed firms in Hong Kong and Singapore and compared their derivatives use to that of US firms. She found that a higher proportion of the Asian firms studied used derivatives than did the US firms, and moreover, that they did so with greater frequency. The evidence suggested that the Asian firms exercised less rigorous oversight of derivatives use than did the US firms, indicated partly by a lower proportion of firms that had a set schedule for evaluating derivatives positions.
Sample description and variable definitions
The data for this study were collected through a survey. In September 2000, a questionnaire was sent to Korean and Swedish nonfinancial firms (excluding utilities). Three hundred and eighty-seven Korean firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange and 250 Swedish firms listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange received the questionnaire, which was sent in either a Korean or Swedish version as appropriate to increase the response rate. In January 2001, a reminder was sent to firms that did not respond to the first mailing. A total of 163 responses were received, 60 from Korean firms and 103 from Swedish firms. This represents a total response rate of 26%: 16% for the Korean and 41% for the Swedish sample. To check for response bias, responding firms were compared with those that did not respond to the survey, and the result suggested that the sample is unbiased (see Appendix A).
The use of a survey was necessary since information on firms' exposures and hedging practices is not publicly available. One caveat to bear in mind is that, although the information provided is unique and may provide important insights, surveys have several general shortcomings, such as the risk that survey subjects may give inaccurate or dishonest responses. In addition, because in our case the respondents are from two different countries with different cultures and languages, there is the additional problem of how respondents interpret the questions from Korean-and Swedish-language versions of the questionnaires. Firms operate under business conditions that differ in many respects between these two countries, and it should be noted that this survey, like other similar surveys, can only document a limited set of characteristics and differences. It should be taken into account that other not included variables could add to, or explain, some of the results.
The questionnaire contained questions regarding (1) the respondent's exposure to foreign exchange rates and whether the respondent firm hedges; (2) the respondent's use of foreign currency derivatives (types of instruments, frequency of use, concerns); (3) the respondent's use of other foreign exchange risk management methods (foreign debt, internal techniques); and (4) the respondent's control and reporting procedures (decisionmaking process, evaluation).
2 Our decision to focus on only one type of exposure-FX exposure-and the hedging of this exposure has the downside that possible correlations with the hedging of other exposures are ignored. However, one important benefit is that the survey is kept shorter, possibly improving response rates and allowing for a deeper analysis of one exposure.
Summary statistics pertaining to the FX exposure of the sampled Swedish and Korean firms are shown in Table 1 , panel (A). Swedish firms are characterized by higher levels of FX exposure for revenues, costs, and net assets as compared to Korean firms, although the percentage of firms with FX exposure is similar for each category. Also, the percentage of firms that indicated no exposure is similar in both countries. Furthermore, as can be seen in panel (B), larger proportions of Korean firms hedged, used foreign debt, and used internal methods, but these differences are not significant at a 10% level. However, the proportion of Korean firms that used derivatives was significantly lower.
Reported differences, or the lack of such, may result from firm characteristics, differences between national markets, or a combination of the two factors. This is investigated further using logit regressions, as was done by Géczy et al. (1997) , including firm characteristics as control variables. The dependent variables are decision variables representing firms' decisions regarding hedging policy and choice of instruments. Three decision variables are used, defined as follows: 3 (a) Hedging (H), a dummy variable representing the decision to hedge. This variable is assigned a value of 1 in the case of a firm that hedged (using currency derivatives, foreign-denominated debt, internal methods, or a combination of the three) and 0 otherwise. All responding firms that indicated FX exposure are included in the analysis. (b) Currency derivatives (CD), a dummy variable representing the decision to use currency derivatives to hedge. This variable is assigned a value of 1 in the case of a firm that used derivatives to hedge and 0 otherwise. Only firms that hedged are included in the analysis. Thus, this decision is defined as incremental to the decision to hedge. (c) Foreign debt (FD), a dummy variable representing the decision to use foreigndenominated debt to hedge. This variable is assigned a value of 1 in the case of a The table contains descriptive statistics for firmsT foreign exchange exposure and hedging practices. Panel (A) presents the foreign exchange exposure of revenues, costs, and net assets for the sampled firms, where the exposure is calculated as the percentage of the total denominated in foreign currency. The last column presents the number and percentage of firms that had no exposure. bNo. of firms exposedQ represents the total number of firms with exposures of more than zero, bPercentage of firms exposedQ is calculated as the percentage of responding firms with exposures of more than zero, and bNo. of answersQ is the total number of firms that answered each question. Panel (B) presents descriptive statistics for sample firmsT hedging practices. For the first reporting column, bYesQ represents the number of firms that answered that they hedged, bNo. of firmsQ represents the total number of firms that responded, while bPercentageQ represents the proportion of responding firms that indicated that they hedged. The last row presents the p-value from a Pearson Chi-square test for country difference in the proportion of firms that hedged. Reporting columns 2 to 4 follow the same logic.
firm that used foreign-denominated debt to hedge and 0 otherwise. As for the variable CD, only firms that hedged were included in the analysis.
The explanatory variables for these regressions include a country dummy as well as proxies for FX exposure, size, growth opportunities, leverage, and liquidity. The reasons for including these variables and how proxies are defined are as follows (predicted signs for the model with dependent variable H appear in parentheses):
(i) Country dummy. This dummy measures the difference between the likelihood of finding a Swedish firm and that of finding a Korean firm that, for example, hedges, given that all other variables are controlled for. The dummy is set to 1 for Swedish and to 0 for Korean firms (F0). (ii) FX exposure. It is expected that direct exposure to FX rates is positively related to the use of hedging instruments (see, e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Hagelin, 2003) . The proxy for FX exposure is defined as the average of the share of total revenues and share of total costs that are denominated in foreign currency (+).
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(iii) Size. Empirical evidence suggests that economies of scale may influence the decision to use derivatives (see, e.g., Hagelin, 2003) . This may carry over to this setting, as, for example, the implementation of a hedging program may be expected to exhibit economies of scale. The proxy for size is the logarithm of total revenues (+).
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(iv) Growth opportunities. Theoretical findings suggest that hedging reduces the incentive to underinvest (see Myers, 1977; Bessembinder, 1991) . Because firms with more valuable growth opportunities are more likely to be affected by the underinvestment problem, these firms may be more likely to hedge. The proxy for growth opportunities is the book-to-market ratio. A lower value of this proxy variable suggests more valuable growth opportunities (À). (v) Leverage. Hedging can reduce the variance of the value of the firm and thereby the expected cost of financial distress (see Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Leverage can thus be hypothesized as positively related to hedging. The proxy for leverage is the book value of debt-to-equity ratio (+). (vi) Liquidity. Hedging could increase the value of the firm by lowering the expected costs of financial distress (see Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Nance et al. (1993) hypothesized that the probability of encountering financial distress may be reduced by maintaining more liquid assets, thereby reducing the need to hedge. The proxy for liquidity is the current ratio (À).
Data for creating the dependent and explanatory variables (i) and (ii) were taken from the survey responses. The financial data required to calculate explanatory variables (iii)-(vi) were collected from stock market guides: for the Korean firms from the Korea Company Handbook (Asia-Pacific Infoserv, 2000) and for the Swedish firms from the Nordbankens Aktieguide (Delphi Economics, 2000) . All financial variables were as of the beginning of year 2000.
In addition to the reported regressions, we also used alternative specifications which included industry dummies, with industries classified according to Bodnar et al. (1996) , Berkman et al. (1997) , and Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) . This did not change the results. Lel (2003) found that internal corporate governance structures influenced the hedging decision. Thus, it may be expected that the hedging practices of Korean chaebols (large conglomerates, such as Daewoo, Hyundai, and Samsung, usually dominated by a founding family) would differ from those of other firms (for studies on Korean chaebols see, e.g., Campbell and Keys, 2002; Ferris et al., 2001; Lim, 2001) . Three different classification systems for chaebols were included: the classification system from Korea Listed Companies, 1999 (KLC), (Hyundai Securities), the classification system from the Korean Fair Trade Law (FTL; as used by Lim, 2001) , and a more detailed classification system devised by Lim (2001) . According to the classification system presented in KLC, 22 of the 60 surveyed Korean firms were chaebols, while according to the FTL system, only 14 of the 60 firms were chaebols. 6 The inclusion of dummy variables for chaebols did not change the results, but the small sample size means that no inference should be drawn from this inconclusive result. Further research is needed to determine possible differences in hedging behavior between chaebols and other firms.
Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results. The results of the three logit regressions, representing the decision variables discussed in Section 3, appear in Table 2 . Before proceeding, a comment on the organization of this section is in order. Subsection 4.1 discusses various aspects of the hedging decision as represented by Model (2a) in Table 2 . Subsection 4.2 presents findings regarding the use of derivatives and discusses Model (2b). Subsection 4.3 presents findings pertaining to foreign-denominated debt, represented by Model (2c), and internal hedging methods. Subsection 4.4, the last subsection, treats control and reporting procedures.
At least two shortcomings of the logit regression models in Table 2 should be noted. The first is that our classification of firms by means of dummy variables is crude. For example, the decision whether to hedge or not, represented by Model (2a), may conceal other relevant information, such as how much is hedged in each currency, whether or not exposures in various currencies are hedged, and how long the hedge horizon is. The second shortcoming is that the sample is small, especially for Models (2b) and (2c). Thus, (2b) is CD, a dummy that has the value of one if a firm uses derivatives and zero otherwise. In Model (2c), the dependent variable is FD, a dummy that is set to one if a firm uses foreign debt to hedge. The independent variables are as follows: Country-a dummy set to one for Swedish firms; Size-the logarithm of total revenues; Liquidity-the current ratio (current assets divided by short-term debt); Growth-the book-to-market ratio; Leverage-the debt-to-equity ratio; Exposure-the average of the share of total revenues and costs that is denominated in foreign currency. For each model the coefficients, marginal effects (D prob.), and p-values of the coefficients are reported. For each model, the Cox and Snell pseudo R 2 is reported. The last two columns present the percentage of correctly predicted observations and the number of observations, respectively. Each of these columns presents the total, and in parentheses, the corresponding number of zeros and ones, respectively. The models are estimated with intercepts (not reported).
we should use caution when interpreting the regression results. However, it should be noted that various relevant information is provided by the surveys and presented in conjunction with the regression results, enriching the information concerning the regression results. Furthermore, the regressions are valuable in the sense that they indicate possible country effects that cannot be explained by the exposure of individual firms or other firm characteristics (included in the regressions).
Hedging
Model (2a) in Table 2 contains the dependent variable, H, which is set to 1 if a firm hedges and to 0 otherwise. The coefficients for size and exposure are both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the decision to hedge FX exposure is strongly influenced by both the size of the firm and its FX exposure. This is in line with earlier studies that found support for economies of scale in the use of derivatives, which would translate in this setting into economies of scale in setting up a hedging program. Though the country dummy is negative, suggesting that Korean firms hedged more, it is not statistically significant; thus, the null hypothesis of no country effect cannot be rejected. Overall, the results are supported by the responses from firms that did not hedge. The nonhedgers were asked to rank the factors influencing their decision not to hedge (not reported). The responses suggest that insignificant FX exposure, difficulties in estimating the FX exposure, and the costs of setting up a hedging program were important determinants of the decision not to hedge for firms in both countries.
Firms that hedged were asked to rank three prespecified objectives for hedging FX exposure. The results suggest differences between Korean and Swedish firms, as displayed in Fig. 1 . Korean firms hedged primarily to reduce cash flow volatility, while Swedish firms primarily hedged to reduce fluctuations in accounting earnings.
Korean firms ranked the latter alternative about as highly as did Swedish firms. The results can be compared to Berkman et al. (1997) and Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) , who found similar differences between New Zealand or German firms and US firms. US firms emphasized cash flows as well as earnings, while firms in New Zealand and Germany focused relatively more on earnings. Also, Marshall (2000) found that Asian MNCs, like German and New Zealand firms, largely focused on earnings.
7 Berkman et al. (1997) and Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) argued that the differences may be attributed to differences in accounting regulations, where accounting rules in the non-US countries made a stronger link between accounting earnings and cash flows. This link is due to the comparatively strong connection between earnings, taxes, and dividend payments. Swedish accounting regulation is tax related and somewhat similar to German regulation (see Hung, 2001) , while Korean accounting has, since the Asian crisis in 1997, been heavily influenced by US GAAP, which would support these arguments. However, La Porta et al. (1998) reported that Korean accounting standards lag Swedish standards considerably. Therefore, an alternative and perhaps more plausible explanation is that Korean firms focus on cash flows because earnings are manipulated extensively by, for example, backward accounting practices, and in the case of chaebols, the transfer of profits within these large conglomerates.
8 From Fig. 1 , it is also evident that Swedish firms ranked hedging of the balance sheet as about as important as hedging cash flows, ranking it considerably higher than did Korean firms. As compared to firms in the US and Europe (Bodnar et al., 1998 (Bodnar et al., , 2003 Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999) , Swedish firms seem to focus relatively more on balance sheet hedging. This practice is not supported by theory since it is aimed at accounting numbers and not cash flows. However, if this hedging is a proxy for economic exposure (see Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1997; Hagelin and Pramborg, 2004a) or if firms have loan covenants expressed in accounting ratios (see Hagelin and Pramborg, 2004b) , such hedging may be rational.
Currency derivatives
4.2.1. The decision to use derivatives Table 2 , Model (2b), presents the results of a logit regression on the decision to use derivatives. The dependent variable is CD, a dummy that is set to 1 if a firm uses currency derivatives and to 0 otherwise. This model includes hedgers only, so the 8 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. implicit assumption is that the choice to use derivatives is subsequent to the decision to hedge. It is suggested that derivatives use differs significantly between firms in the two countries, Swedish firms being more likely to use derivatives to hedge FX exposure than are Korean firms. Furthermore, firm size is positively related to the decision to use derivatives, confirming earlier findings that there are economies of scale in the use of derivatives. This country difference may be due to a number of factors. It may partly be a consequence of the maturity of the two markets. The Swedish derivatives market was established relatively early on, when the options exchange began trading in 1986; in Korea, derivatives trading on exchanges began as recently as 1996 for stock index futures and 1997 for stock index options. The trading of FX derivatives in Korea began as recently as 1999, when the Korean Futures Exchange opened for trading in standardized USD futures and options. The longer history of the Swedish market suggests that Swedish firms have more experience using these types of instruments. However, Korean firms have long been able to use, for example, nondelivered forwards in Singapore for their US dollar-won exposure, so this difference in experience may thus be of less significance. A related, and perhaps more important, reason for the difference between Korean and Swedish firms is that in Korea, OTC derivatives have until recently been heavily regulated by the authorities (due to the potential risk in derivative products, despite their positive economic role as risk-hedging instruments). This heavy regulation can be expected to have discouraged Korean firms from using derivatives. It was only in April 1999 that government regulation changed, freeing up derivatives trading.
9 If this interpretation of the country difference is correct, the relative reluctance of Korean firms to use derivatives may be a transitory phenomenon.
The above discussion is supported by the responses displayed in Table 3 , regarding reasons for not using derivatives. This question asked firms to rank three of seven alternatives, assigning them the following values: 3 = most important, 2 = next most important, and 1 = least important. Panel (A) displays the percentages of firms that assigned each alternative a btop threeQ ranking. Panel (B) displays the mean rank of each alternative, where the results include only the responses of those firms that ranked the alternative among their top three reasons. Thus, the values in panel (B) could range from 1.00 (if all firms that ranked the alternative ranked it as least important) to 3.00 (if all firms that ranked the alternative ranked it as most important). The only significant difference between the countries is in their ranking of alternative (c), bDifficulty pricing and valuing derivatives,Q suggesting that Korean firms have relatively less experience with derivatives.
The proportion of firms that chose to rank this alternative, (c), as well as the average rank assigned differs significantly between the two countries. This was the most important reason for Korean firms (78% ranked this alternative, with a mean rank of 2.21), while for Swedish firms, this alternative was ranked low (33% ranked this alternative, with the lowest possible mean rank of 1.00). It should be noted that the number of responses to this question was relatively low. In general, the results presented in Table 3 are in line with the findings of Bodnar et al. (1998) , with the notable exception that Korean firms chose to rank alternative (c) among their three most important reasons relatively often. Only 16% of US firms chose to rank this alternative, which may reflect the relative maturity of the US derivatives markets.
Types of derivatives used and types of exposure hedged
The types of derivatives used were similar among firms in both countries, Fig. 2 displaying the pertinent results. In the figure, the bars represent the proportion of firms that used each derivative instrument, where a higher value implies a larger proportion of firms. The lines represent the frequency of use for those firms that used the type of derivative, a higher value indicating that the derivative was used more often. Forward contracts were most popular, over 75% of the firms in each country using these contracts, most doing so frequently.
Swaps, futures contracts, and OTC options were used somewhat less, and other options were favored less than all the other instruments. The relative popularities of the various types of derivatives among firms in both countries are similar to those reported in earlier research (see, e.g., Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999) . The table presents the responses to the question as to why firms chose not to use derivatives. A total of 27 answers was obtained, of which 9 were from Korean and 18 from Swedish firms. The rankings were 3 = most important, 2 = next most important, and 1 = least important of the three chosen reasons. Panel (A) presents the percentage of firms that ranked each alternative among its three most important reasons for not using derivatives. The last column of panel (A) contains p-values for differences between countries, calculated using the Pearson Chi-square statistic. Panel (B) contains the mean rank that was assigned to each alternative by those firms ranking it among their three most important reasons. The last column of panel (B) contains the p-values for differences in means, obtained using t-tests.
The types of exposures that were hedged using derivatives are similar among the firms in the two countries. Table 4 displays the responses to the question about this, adding to the evidence presented in Fig. 1 regarding the ultimate reasons for hedging (cash flows, accounting earnings, and translation hedging).
There is no systematic difference in the use of derivatives between firms in the two countries. Thus, the documented differences in the stated purposes of hedging FX exposure (Fig. 1) do not necessarily result in practical differences in hedging behavior between firms in the two countries. Note, for example, that a relatively large proportion of the sampled firms in both countries used derivatives to hedge the translation of foreign accounting statements, despite the difference suggested in Fig. 1 . Thus, although the relative emphasis on various objectives of hedging, as suggested in Fig. 1 , may differ between firms in the two countries, in practice, all the objectives may be of some concern, and thus be hedged. One interesting observation is that Swedish firms were likely to engage in speculation. About a third of the Swedish respondents indicated that they speculated, and half of those firms did so frequently. These proportions are similar to those found by Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) .
Concerns about derivatives use
Concerns about the use of derivatives differ substantially in degree, as reported in Table 5 . Korean firms are more concerned across the board and significantly so for alternatives (a)-(e). This may help explain why the Korean firms sampled are less likely to use derivatives than are the Swedish firms. Other studies examining concerns with derivatives use have also found significant differences between firms from different countries; Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) reported differences between German and US firms, with German firms displaying less concern; Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) presented evidence from a comparison of Swedish and US firms, suggesting that Swedish firms are less concerned than US firms; and Bodnar et al. (2003) found differences between Dutch and US firms, with Dutch firms displaying less concern. Differences may arise from a number of factors, such as firm-level differences in policies towards controlling and monitoring derivatives-related activities within the firm (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999) , or as a consequence of differences in disclosure requirements regarding derivatives and the relative risk of corporate litigation for insufficient fiduciary care (Bodnar et al., 2003) . The difference between Korean and Swedish firms could, at least to some extent, be due to differences in disclosure requirements. Since the Asian crisis of 1997, Korean accounting regulation has primarily been based on US GAAP, while Swedish accounting is similar to German and Dutch accounting. However, Korean accounting had until recently been similar to German and Japanese accounting, and the accounting standards of Korea are substantially lower than those of Sweden according to La Porta et al. (1998) . 10 This suggests that Korean 10 After the 1997 financial crisis, IMF and World Bank pressure led to Korean accounting standards being upgraded in an attempt to harmonize them with best practice, defined as requirements from the IAS and, above all, US GAAP (see Choi, 1999) . The table presents the responses to the question as to what purposes firms used derivatives. A total of 64 answers was obtained, of which 21 were from Korean and 43 from Swedish firms. The rankings were 3 = frequently, 2 = seldom, 1 = never, and 0 = don't know. Panel (A) contains the percentage of firms that assigned the alternative a rank of at least 2, thus indicating that they used derivatives at least seldom for this purpose. Panel (B) contains the percentage of derivatives users that assigned the alternative the rank of 3, thus indicating that they used derivatives frequently. The last columns of panels (A and B) contain p-values for the differences between countries, calculated using the Pearson Chi-square statistic.
firms' great concerns regarding derivatives, and consequent reluctance to use them, may rather be a consequence of their relative inexperience with these instruments, as discussed above.
4.3. Other foreign exchange risk management methods 4.3.1. Foreign-denominated debt Model (2c) in Table 2 reports the results of a logit regression on the decision to use foreign-denominated debt to hedge. The dependent variable is FD, a dummy that is set to 1 if a firm uses foreign debt and to 0 otherwise. Using a 10% level of significance, the results of this regression suggest that there is a positive relationship between the size of a firm and the use of foreign debt. Also note that the sign of the country dummy is opposite to that of the country dummy in Model (2b) with a pvalue of 0.102, thus marginally above statistical significance. Given that Korean firms are more concerned about the use of derivatives, they may be inclined to use foreign debt instead of currency derivatives.
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Firms were asked in the questionnaire to report the types of exposure they hedged using foreign-denominated debt and the frequency of such hedging. Table 6 displays the responses to this question. The table presents the responses to the question about concerns regarding derivatives use. A total of 90 answers was obtained, of which 39 were from Korean and 51 from Swedish firms. The rankings were 3 = high, 2 = moderate, 1 = low, and 0 = no concern. Panel (A) contains the percentage of firms that assigned each alternative a rank of at least 2, indicating a moderate or high degree of concern. The last column of panel (A) contains p-values for the differences between countries, calculated using the Pearson Chi-square statistic. Panel (B) contains the mean rank assigned to each alternative. The last column of panel (B) contains p-values for differences in means, calculated using t-tests.
It is evident that significant proportions of firms in both countries used foreigndenominated debt for hedging purposes. This underscores the importance of foreigndenominated debt as a hedging instrument and suggests that research aimed at explaining hedging decisions by firms should examine the use of foreign-denominated debt. Importantly, Korean firms used foreign debt significantly more often to hedge cash flow transactions than did Swedish firms. This finding suggests that once the decision was taken to use foreign debt, Korean firms used this instrument extensively. It also supports the finding in Table 2 that Korean firms were more likely to use foreign-denominated debt to hedge than were Swedish firms. One caveat, however, is that there may be alternative motives for extensive use of foreign-denominated debt. Allayannis et al. (2003) found evidence that firms make trade-offs between the benefits of lower foreign borrowing costs and a probable increase in financial risk due to exchange rate uncertainty. The higher the positive interest rate differential between domestic and foreign debt, the more likely firms are to use foreign-denominated debt. Accordingly, the high level of foreign-denominated debt use by Korean firms may be a symptom of high overall debt use and their attempt to attract foreign capital to retire high-interest domestic debt in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. This is one way of arbitraging in the debt market, but one finding contradicts whether such arbitrage was the primary intention here: in responding to question (d) in Table 6 , Korean firms were somewhat less likely to indicate that they arbitraged with foreign-denominated debt. Nevertheless, it is possible that Korean firms chose foreign-denominated debt not only driven by hedging demands and a reluctance to use derivatives, but also for financing purposes. The table presents the responses to the question as to what purposes firms used foreign-denominated debt. A total of 64 answers was obtained, of which 21 were from Korean and 43 from Swedish firms. The rankings were 3 = frequently, 2 = seldom, 1 = never, and 0 = don't know. Panel (A) contains the percentage of firms that gave an alternative a rank of at least 2, indicating that they used foreign debt for the purpose. Panel (B) contains the percentage of foreign debt users that assigned the alternative a rank of 3, indicating that they used foreign debt frequently for the purpose. The last columns of panels (A and B) contain p-values for differences between countries, calculated using the Pearson Chi-square statistic.
In sum, the results indicate that foreign-denominated debt is used for hedging purposes by a large proportion of firms in both countries, that there is a country difference, and possibly that foreign debt is used as a substitute for derivatives, especially by Korean firms.
Internal methods
In the literature, most research has focused on derivatives and/or foreign-denominated debt. Internal methods are often overlooked but are likely to be an important part of firms' risk management strategies.
12 In fact, the use of internal hedging techniques has been found to be very common among firms (see, e.g., Hakkarainen et al., 1998; Joseph, 2000; Marshall, 2000) . Internal hedging techniques include leading and lagging of revenues and costs, netting of trade receivables and payables among associated companies, and domestic currency invoicing.
Firms were asked in our survey how often they used various internal hedging techniques. An important finding is that most hedgers in the sample used internal methods (only nine firms indicated that they did not). This finding, together with those of the studies cited in the previous paragraph, suggests that firms across a range of markets make extensive use of internal hedging methods. Fig. 3 displays the responses to this question. Note that the methods surveyed in this study primarily reflect the hedging demands of relatively short-term exposures (implicitly assuming a static organization structure) and exclude long-term strategic considerations, such as the shifting of production or plant location. See Marshall (2000) for survey evidence concerning strategies for hedging longer term economic exposures.
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The bars in Fig. 3 represent the proportion of firms that used each technique, where a higher value implies a larger proportion of firms. The lines represent the frequency of use on the part of those firms that used each technique, where a higher value indicates that the technique was used more often. The relative popularity of various techniques in the two countries was broadly similar. Matching inflows and outflows was the most common technique in both countries, followed by inter-company netting for Swedish firms, and leading and lagging for Korean firms. As suggested by the lines in Fig. 3 , when adopting a technique, Swedish firms used it more often than did Korean firms, except for leading and lagging. Our findings regarding the Swedish firms are in line with the findings of Hakkarainen et al. (1998 ), Joseph (2000 , and Marshall (2000); 14 our findings, however, differ somewhat from theirs in terms of the relatively common use of leading and lagging we found among Korean firms.
Control and reporting procedures
In the questionnaire, firms were asked about their control and reporting procedures. They were specifically asked how often they evaluated their FX risk position, and how they evaluated their risk management function.
15 Fig. 4 shows how often the risk position was evaluated. Swedish firms were more likely to have a set schedule, with less than 10% of Swedish firms having no set schedule. Korean firms, on the other hand, were much more likely to evaluate as needed, adhering to no set schedule. Earlier surveys have asked about the evaluation of derivatives positions and not, as here, about the total risk position. However, both types of questions may produce very similar answers, since it is likely that these two valuations are made simultaneously. If so, the Swedish sample conforms to earlier results pertaining to Sweden, Germany, and the US (see Alkebäck and Hagelin, 1999; Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999) , while Korean firms in this comparison stand out by the high proportion (41%) of them that 14 Joseph (2000) and Marshall (2000) studied different types of exposure. The utilization rates presented in Fig.  3 are compared to the figures for the hedging of transaction exposure, the dominant form of hedging used by the firms studied. 15 Firms were also asked whether the decision-making process concerning policy, strategy, and execution was centralized or decentralized. The proportion of Swedish firms using a centralized decision-making process was significantly higher, regardless as to whether the decision concerned policy, strategy, or the execution of risk management. 13 For this question, firms could also choose alternative g-bother.Q However, since only 18 of the 90 firms that answered the question responded to this particular alternative, this alternative is not included. evaluate as needed or have no evaluation schedule. However, Sheedy (2001) found that 36% of the studied firms from Hong Kong and Singapore did not have a schedule for evaluating their derivatives positions. It seems that Asian firms are less likely to have scheduled evaluations of risk positions than do Western firms. Two robustness tests were performed. First, a logit regression on the decision as to whether or not to have scheduled evaluations suggests that the country difference is robust and also that the greater the exposure, the more likely firms were to conduct scheduled evaluations. Second, an ordered probit regression on the frequency of reporting suggests that larger firms evaluated more often, firms with greater FX exposure evaluated more often, and that Swedish firms evaluated their positions more often than did Korean firms. This corroborates Sheedy (2001) who found that the Asian firms in her sample lagged US firms in their oversight of derivatives activity. Fig. 5 presents findings regarding the method used to evaluate the FX risk management function within firms. These findings suggest that firms in both Korea and Sweden primarily evaluated the risk management function by absolute profit/loss. This supports earlier results (see, e.g., Bodnar et al., 1998; Sheedy, 2001 ) but is nonetheless somewhat puzzling, since risk management should, theoretically, be aimed at reducing risk and not at seeking economic rents. Bodnar et al. (1998) reported that about 40% of their sample used a profit-based approach, and about the same proportion of firms used risk-adjusted measures. Sheedy (2001) reported similar numbers for firms in Hong Kong and Singapore, and Bodnar et al. (2003) reported that 57% of Dutch firms used a profit-based approach. For the Korean and Swedish firms we surveyed, the proportions of firms using a profit-based approach-alternatives (b) and (c) in Fig. 5 -are even higher at 71% and 61%, respectively. 16 One possible effect of this is that managers could be more inclined to speculate in order to increase profits, or, alternatively, that firms that speculate are more likely to adopt a profit-based approach to evaluate the risk management function. Supporting this link is a significant and positive correlation between speculation with derivatives and the evaluation of the risk function using a profit-based approach. 
Conclusions
This paper surveys Swedish and Korean nonfinancial firms on their foreign exchange risk exposure and hedging practices. The findings suggest similarities between firms in the two countries, with notable exceptions.
The aim of hedging activity differed between the countries, Korean firms being more likely to focus on minimizing fluctuations of cash flows, while Swedish firms 17 Using a logit regression with the decision to speculate with derivatives as a dependent variable suggests that speculation is positively associated with firm size and with a profit-based approach ( P-value of 0.059). The country effect suggested in Table 6 is also confirmed, in that Swedish firms were significantly more likely to engage in speculation. favored minimizing fluctuations of earnings or protecting the appearance of the balance sheet. The proportion of firms that used derivatives was significantly lower in the Korean than in the Swedish sample. This could not be captured by firm characteristics such as FX exposure, size, liquidity, or leverage. This may be due to the higher fixed costs incurred by Korean firms initiating derivatives programs. These higher costs could result from the relative immaturity of Korean derivatives markets and, perhaps more importantly, from Korean authorities' heavy regulation of OTC derivatives use. Korean firms relied to a larger extent on alternative hedging methods, suggesting that the decision to hedge was not country specific but rather driven by firm-specific variables, such as the level of FX exposure and firm size. It is further suggested that Korean firms were less rigorous in monitoring their risk positions than were Swedish firms. Finally, a large proportion of firms in both countries used a profit-based approach to evaluate the risk management function, which is counter to theoretical recommendations and bolsters the findings of Bodnar et al. (1998) and Sheedy (2001) .
